The question of disarming Hezbollah remains one of Lebanon’s most intricate and sensitive challenges. This is not merely a matter of security or politics; it is deeply connected with the country’s sectarian balance and regional power dynamics. Since the end of the civil war and the signing of the Taif Agreement in 1989, Hezbollah’s arsenal has existed outside the state’s control, justified by the banner of “resistance against Israel.” Yet today, Lebanon’s severe economic crisis and shifting regional currents have thrust this issue back into the national spotlight.
Can the Lebanese state realistically disarm Hezbollah?
In practical terms, the Lebanese state’s capacity to fully disarm Hezbollah is minimal. Hezbollah, by contrast, is not a mere militia but a deeply entrenched hybrid entity, part political party, part military force, part social movement, sustained by its own economic networks and a loyal social base. Given the state’s institutional fragility, deep divisions, and lack of unified national will, any unilateral attempt to disarm Hezbollah risks exacerbating internal fractures and plunging the country into deeper turmoil.
How meaningful is Israel’s ‘partial intelligence assistance’?
Recently, reports have surfaced indicating that Israel has indirectly provided intelligence on Hezbollah’s weapons depots and military sites to certain Lebanese actors or international partners. While such intelligence may be accurate and operationally useful, its broader political and strategic impact is limited. Without being embedded in a comprehensive national or regional framework, this kind of “partial assistance” is unlikely to produce enduring results.
Moreover, these manoeuvres could easily backfire within Lebanon’s political environment. If leveraged as evidence of “betrayal” or “collaboration with foreign powers” by Hezbollah’s opponents, they could bolster Hezbollah’s narrative of armed resistance against external threats.
Would Hezbollah ever lay down its weapons voluntarily?
Historical experience has shown that the integration of its forces into state structures can occur under the umbrella of a comprehensive national reconciliation. Such an accord would necessarily involve a sweeping bargain, incorporating not only Lebanon’s internal factions but also key regional stakeholders, including Iran, Syria, and Israel. Hezbollah would insist on robust political representation and guarantees within the Lebanese state as part of any such settlement.
Is there a domestic consensus on this issue?
The reality is stark: there is no unified national stance in Lebanon on the question of Hezbollah’s weapons. To some, Hezbollah remains a bulwark against Israeli aggression, its weapons a deterrent Lebanon can ill afford to surrender. To others, it is an armed actor holding the state hostage, its arsenal a perpetual reminder of Lebanon’s compromised sovereignty and damaging Lebanon’s relations with Arab and international partners. This division is not simply ideological; it is structural, rooted in the sectarian architecture of Lebanon’s political system. Thus, the debate over disarmament often reduces to a matter of tactical bargaining rather than principled state-building.
What would Hezbollah’s disarmament entail?
Should Hezbollah ever be disarmed, the consequences would echo across Lebanon and the Middle East. It would fundamentally reshape Lebanon’s internal balance of power and alter the security architecture of the region. Iran’s influence along the Damascus-Beirut corridor could wane, while Israel’s concerns about border security might be substantially eased. Yet there also looms the risk of a security vacuum within Lebanon itself. Meaningful disarmament would thus require not only robust state structures but also a carefully managed regional balance of power.
Given this complex scenery, the prospect of disarming Hezbollah remains, for now, a deferred ambition. It is neither a challenge that can be met by brute force nor one that can be resolved through unilateral measures. Ultimately, the deeper question for Lebanon is whether its people and political classes can forge a state that is inclusive, just, and resilient, or whether the issue of arms will continue to cast a long, destabilising shadow over Lebanon’s future.
*The views expressed in this content are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of İdrakpost.
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